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GLD-047        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1175 
 ___________ 
 
 SPENCER BOWENS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-01575) 
 District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 21, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed:  January 4, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Spencer Bowens appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the 
 
 
District Court.  See
 In September 1998, a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia found Bowens guilty of conspiracy to possess and distribute crack 
cocaine, powder cocaine, and heroin; two counts of harboring a fugitive from arrest; and 
obstruction of justice.  The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) indicated that Bowens qualified 
as a career offender based on two New York state robbery convictions.  Bowens 
challenged that classification at sentencing.  The sentencing court rejected Bowens’ 
argument, noting that the New York convictions were not related for purposes of the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines because the underlying robbery offenses were separated by 
an intervening arrest.  Bowens was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated 
Bowens’ convictions for harboring a fugitive, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and 
sentence.  United States v. Bowens
 In July 2010, Bowens filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, seeking to “challeng[e] the calculation of his criminal history 
, 224 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2000).  In 2002, Bowens’ 
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied.  The Fourth 
Circuit denied Bowens’ request for a certificate of appealabilty.  Thereafter, Bowens filed 
a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 (“Clerical Error”), again 
alleging that he was improperly classified as a career offender based on the two New 
York robbery convictions.  The District Court denied relief, noting that it had already 
addressed Bowens’ argument, which, in any event, was not properly brought pursuant to 
Rule 36.   
 
 
score under the federal Sentencing Guidelines in order to secure a more favorable 
custody classification.”  The Government filed a response.  The District Court dismissed 
the petition, offering several separate justifications for rejecting Bowens’ claim.  First, 
the District Court held that Bowens’ “challenge to his [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] 
custody classification is not properly pursued in a § 2241 petition” because it did not 
implicate the fact or duration of his sentence.  Second, the District Court reasoned that, 
“[r]egardless of how [Bowens] labels his PSR[-]related claim, it clearly questions the 
legality of his federal sentence.”  Because Bowens failed to demonstrate that a motion 
under § 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy, the District Court held that 
his claim was not cognizable under § 2241.  Finally, the District Court suggested that the 
Government had properly argued that Bowens’ “pending action is deficient since he is 
attempting ‘to rehash the same argument’ that he previously unsuccessfully raised before 
the sentencing court.”  Bowens appealed.    
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of District Court’s 
legal conclusions is plenary and we apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of 
fact.  See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).  We may affirm the 
District Court on any basis supported by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although Bowens filed an “Application for Issuance of a 
Certificate of Appealability [“COA”], a COA is not required to appeal the denial of a 
§ 2241 petition.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Nevertheless, we have considered the arguments raised in Bowens’ Application.  
 
 
 A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  See 
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  A petitioner can seek relief 
under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  A 
§ 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot 
meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120, or 
because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 
290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve” provided under 
§ 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such as 
those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  Okereke, 307 
F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).  For example, in Dorsainvil, we 
allowed the petitioner to proceed under § 2241 because an intervening change in the law 
decriminalized conduct for which he had been convicted, and he had no earlier 
opportunity to challenge that conviction.  Dorsainvil
 Bowens claims that he was improperly classified as a career offender because he 
did not have the requisite two “prior felony convictions.”  U.S.S.G. § § 4B1.1.  Although 
Bowens was arrested and charged with robbery on two separate occasions, he asserts that 
one of those charges was later dismissed and that he was ultimately convicted of only one 
robbery count.  This is not the rare situation rendering § 2255 inadequate or ineffective.  
Bowens has not been convicted of an offense that was later found to be noncriminal.  
, 119 F. 3d at 251. 
 
 
Instead, Bowens raises arguments concerning his career offender status that were raised 
at his sentencing proceeding, and that could have been pursued on direct appeal or in his 
§ 2255 motion.  That Bowens has already unsuccessfully pursued a § 2255 motion in the 
sentencing court and now faces a statutory bar to filing another one does not show the 
inadequacy of that remedy.  See Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question 
presented by this appeal.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we 
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
1
                                                 
1 Bowens’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion to reopen the appeal are 
granted.   
  
